The concept of
Accordingly, it is thought that in one is contained within the concept of two or ten and that it is possible to derive two or ten by way of one. It is by this pathway that the relationship in which one is the same as all things (一卽一切) and all things are one (一切卽一) is established; furthermore, there come mutual identity and mutual intercausality (相卽相入), which result in this infinitely repeated (重重無盡) Dharma Realm of non-obstruction of particular-phenomena and particular-phenomena (事事無碍法界). This shows an understanding from the standpoint of dependent arising (緣起) in its every part.
It has already become a widely-accepted opinion that dependent arising forms the fundamental idea of Buddhism; and from this basis we can say that the very logic of
The reason why the conflictive contradiction based on emptiness (空) should be a precondition in establishing the logic of
It was Jizang (吉藏, 549‑623) that ideologically developed the logic of
1Kamekawa 1950; Sato 1954 ; Ishii 1989; Jang 1993.
The statement focusing on the “mutual identity of the twofold truth” in the second volume of the
In other words, this means that in the background to the formation of the logic of
Then, to understand the background to the establishment of the mutual identity theory of the twofold truth we should examine how the meaning of the mutual identity of the twofold truth is explained by the masters of the
Jizang introduced the theories formulated by three philosophers—Sengmin (僧旻, 467‑527) of Zhuangyansi (莊嚴寺), Zhizang (智藏, 458‑523) of Kaishansi (開善寺), and Sengchuo (僧綽, unidentified) of Longguangsi (龍光寺)—as the typical conventional meaning of mutual identity. According to Jizang’s explanation, Sengmin and Zhizang clarified that the twofold truth is one body (二諦一体), and Sengchuo made it clear that the twofold truth has a separate essence (二諦異体). Jizang went on to explain that they tried to know whether the conventional meaning of mutual identity belongs to one body (一) or a separate body (異) (T. 45, 105b).
Though Jizang himself did not treat all these three theories in his
Jizang also introduced these two kinds of mutual identity theory in the
In addition the reason for avoiding conceptual distinction allows us to get a sense of Jizang’s attitude in which he tried to discuss the mutual identity of the twofold truth from the standpoint where he took a balanced approach to the
Then, what is Jizang’s own logic of mutual identity? What should be addressed before examining this is that in fact he put a high valuation on the
In that sense, let’s examine first of all how much effect the Huayan idea of non-obstruction had on the establishment of Jizang’s mutual identity of the twofold truth.
His answer in
Jizang’s idea of non-obstruction is connected first to the non-obstruction of emptiness and existence and then to the non-obstruction of the function of the six sense organs; his similar idea of the non-obstruction of emptiness and existence is revealed in his
He explains the idea of the mutual identity between a thought-moment (一念) and innumerable eons (無量劫) based on the teaching of the
Jizang’s statement means that innumerable eons are not different from a thought-moment in that both of them are the way of enlightenment. Nevertheless, this does not mean losing a thought-moment, because so-called innumerable eons are not an assembly of innumerable eons and so is a thought-moment. It is an obvious fact, he says, that innumerable eons are a thought-moment in the way they are. The citation “according to a sutra” at the end of the sentence appears in the
Jizang seriously makes arguments on the meaning of mutual identity in the form of counterarguments to the doctrine of the above-mentioned masters of the
First, in fact Jizang’s main arguments on the two theories by Sengmin and Zhizang concentrate on making adversaries fall into the dilemma of the sameness (同一性) and difference (別異性) of the twofold truth.2 Are they a single body (一体) or a separate body (別体)? That is, the dilemma of sameness and difference can be applied to any themes set up by conceptual distinction. As the twofold truth told by the school based on the
Then from the position in which he contradicts and confutes the traditional meaning of the mutual identity of the twofold truth, how does Jizang account for this issue? After presupposing that the following statement, which interprets the meaning of the mutual identity of emptiness and existence (空有相卽), is one theory of his teacher Falang (法朗, 508‑81), he clearly proclaims as follows in his
Since the twofold truth is the theoretical aspect (敎門) and a verbalism (言說), the concept of existence is the existence of emptiness, that is, nominal existence or existence based on emptiness, although every verbalism says that existence is the conventional truth. Although emptiness is said to be the absolute truth, this emptiness is the emptiness of existence, in other words, nominal emptiness or emptiness involving existence. Likewise, nominal existence and nominal emptiness are both nominal, so emptiness is existence the way it is and existence is emptiness the way it is―the twofold truth becomes mutually identical (相互融卽). This is Jizang’s logic of the mutual identity of the twofold truth.
In short, when viewed neither from the standpoint of sameness (不一) and difference (不異), nor from the standpoint of the
2T. 45, 105b‑c. 3T. 45, 107b‑c.
The ultimate goal (究竟) of Huayan doctrine is also for Ji to be perceived in the flow of mutual identity and mutual intercausality in the Dharma Realm of non-obstruction of particular-phenomena and particular-phenomena (事事無碍法界). Besides, the viewpoint of dependent arising inherent in mutual identity is also the doctrinal theme that underlies the
On the other hand, from the standpoint of the advocates of the One Vehicle theory the afflictions are none other than enlightenment (煩惱卽菩提) and birth-and-death is in itself
However, Fazang (法藏, 643‑712) is most satisfactorily putting forward the logic of
This means that when we think of a phenomenal world with one thing as a center, the way of thinking based on the same body is established; when we think of it from the standpoint of dependence on all the other things, the way of thinking based on the separate essence is set up. In other words, the reason why there are two gates related with the separate essence is that there are always two meanings in all the laws of dependent arising: the first meaning is emptiness and existence seen from the viewpoint of essence and the second meaning is power and no-power seen from the viewpoint of function. This latter means that mutual identity is possible because of dependence on power (力); and that mutual intercausality is possible on account of dependence on no-power (無力).
Here is a concrete explanation of mutual identity from the standpoint of the separate-essence gate (異體門):
In this quote the meaning of mutual identity is revealed from the standpoint of emptiness and existence relevant to essence. Above all, what is the meaning of “going upward”? Going upward means that if one is deemed as the fundamental number (本數), facing nine branch numbers (末數), then one is two; one is three; or one is ten.
In succession, if two is deemed as the fundamental number in the same way, then two is one; two is ten. If ten is thought of as the fundamental number, ten is one; ten is two; ten is nine. The next coming downward is subtracting in order, on the contrary to going upward. Likewise, when we look at everything with one thing at a center, we can understand its sameness with everything. The independence of an individual object and its sameness with the whole are the same body; in comparison, there are countless individual objects in the world, which are the different entities from the standpoint of the dependent relationship between one individual object and another.
Therefore, we can see that mutual identity is the
This explanation intends to set up the logic of
In that sense, mutual identity and mutual intercausality might be said to be free from any obstruction between them.
The “same-essence gate” (同體門) intends to explain the mutual identity and mutual intercausality of the number with which one is inherently equipped; the “gate of mutual entry” (相入門) means that one contains many and many contains one; while the gate of mutual identity (相卽門) means that one is many and many is one. Fazang explained this as follows in his
As far as the mutual identity and mutual intercausality of the same-essence gate4 are concerned, its purpose is not different from that of the separate-essence gate. However, the facts that one is many and many is one are not just repeating the same fact in reverse order at all. The fact that one is many means that an individual being itself represents the whole in mutual identity; on the other hand, in mutual intercausality many is one because the whole represents rather the abstractive aspect of an individual being in the sense in which the very whole is what makes an individual being be truly individual.
Nagarjuna’s (龍樹) viewpoint in
The nature of the dependent arising of the same essence (同體緣起) consists in the time called “the same time” (同時).5 The true original nature of dependent arising should not be explained separately through the concepts of the different essence or the same essence; these conceptual divisions are made for convenience sake. Therefore, it is natural that the explanation of mutual intercausality is changed into that of mutual identity; and that the explanation of the different-essence gate ends up becoming that of the same-essence gate.
Such logic is concretely explained by the metaphor of ten coins (十錢), which originally appears in the
The name “the ten mysterious aspects of dependent arising” is derived from the fact that it represents the realistic image of the extremely profound and subtle world by way of the ten mysterious gates. More concretely it is said to be “the unobstructed teaching on the ten mysterious aspects of dependent arising” (十玄緣起無礙法門). That is to say, the ten mysterious aspects of dependent arising includes within its comprehensive theory the logical fact that all distinctive dharmas (諸法) make contradiction a medium and this contradiction is transcended through
Accordingly, if we try to change our standpoint and clarify the logic of
The essence of particular-phenomena (事) is inherently obstruction; the reason why every single obstructive phenomenon relates to many others (一多相容) and all dharmas have mutual identity (諸法相卽) is that obstruction exists simultaneously as non-obstruction (無障碍). The grounds for claiming this are neither that there is obstruction at first and then there is non-obstruction, nor that there is obstruction before non-obstruction. Saying that obstruction is non-obstruction means only that obstruction is not a simple obstruction.
In short, the Huayan
Therefore this explanation of
In other words, the mutual identity and mutual intercausality of all dharmas are proved on the basis of the dependent relationship between the infinite (無限) essential nature (理性) and all the finite (有限) dharmas; ultimately, from the standpoint of the interpenetration of the essential nature, which is the ground (所依) of particular-phenomena (事, all dharmas [諸法] in the midst of dependent arising), the relationship between any two particular-phenomena is interpenetrated by the media of the essential nature.
However, the dependent arising of mutual identity mentioned here does not mean that two things are connected with each other and simply ‘become one’. It means that each of two things has a clearly different nature and each one negates itself at its core; nevertheless, a new world of unification is given birth by the one and only media of such negation. This process is indeed mutual identity.
4See Kamata (1983, 264). 5Kamekawa (1955, 110). 6The source of this metaphor is the verse “譬如數法十 增一至無量 皆悉是本數 智慧故差別” in the Flower Adornment Sūtra (華嚴經 卷十: T. 9, 465a). However, the metaphor of “ten coins” (十錢) itself does not appear in the text of the Flower Adornment Sūtra; it appears in the Diagram of the Dharma Realm According to the One Vehicle of Huayan by Uisang (義湘) (T. 45, 714b). 7T. 45, 504b. 8T. 35, 124a.
Whether things exist or not is obvious as a concrete fact. However, the question of how to express existing things logically and compossibly becomes a different issue. In that sense, if we presuppose that existence and emptiness intend to explain the same information, which is in the relationship of the surface and the underneath (表裏) of expression, that is possible because existence and emptiness are both included within the relationship of dependent arising.
Therefore, it is incontestable that one of the tasks for forming the nucleus of Mahayana Buddhism is establishing the theory of dependent arising. In other words, since all dharmas have the quality of existence only by the relationship of mutual support and mutual dependence (相資相依), not even one dharma can exist independently in the Dharma Realm. If mutual support and mutual dependence can be possible in the relationship of dependent arising, the opposition and contradiction among all dharmas must precede them as a precondition. This is so because if there were an unconditional sameness from the start, mutual dependence could never happen.
Thus, every being is also non-being without abiding in being because it is a temporary being; emptiness is also non-emptiness without abiding in emptiness, because it is a temporary emptiness. This non-being and non-emptiness (非有非空) is the very middle way (中道) that Jizang mentioned.
Again, the Huayan concept of
Particular-phenomena inherently indicate distinction which means opposition; however, since the logic of
Therefore, if we want to understand the non-obstruction of particular-phenomena and particular-phenomena (事事無碍), which is the central and unifying theory of the Huayan doctrine, we should proceed through the theoretical barrier between mutual identity and mutual intercausality.