In sixteenth century ChosŎn Korea, T’oegye and Kobong initiated a debate over the relationship between the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings, their moral characteristics, and, also, their relationship to other psychological factors. This debate soon called for a successive debate between Yulgok and Ugye who asked more or less the same questions by focusing on the moral mind and the human mind rather than the Four and the Seven. Although Yulgok was debating with Ugye, his real opponent was T’oegye who was then deceased. Yulgok closely studied and rejected most of T’oegye’s theses on (a) the mutual exclusiveness between the Four and the Seven, (b) the identification of the Four with the moral mind and, also, of the Seven with the human mind, and (c) the mutual or reciprocal arousal of li and ki. In this article, I shall contend that Yulgok’s theory of mind is inconsistent in that he mistakenly identified the moral characteristics of the Four with those of the moral mind. I shall begin by examining Yulgok’s reasons for the rejection of the above mentioned theses. In doing this, we shall see the relationship between such psychological concepts as mind, nature, and feelings with respect to ontological concepts such as li and ki. In the end, we shall conclude that Yulgok has to give up the idea that the moral mind shares the same moral characteristics as the Four and the original nature.
There were two rounds of the so-called Four-Seven Debate in sixteenth-century Chosŏn Korea, which characterized Korean Neo-Confucianism.1 The first round was between Yi Hwang (T’oegye, 1501–1570) and Ki Tae-sŭng (Kobong, 1527–1572) who debated over the question of whether, and how, the Four Beginnings (Sadan, 四端) and the Seven Feelings (Ch’ilchŏng, 七情) can be explained in terms of
In contrast, the second round of the Four-Seven Debate was between Yi I (Yulgok, 1536–1584) and Sŏng Hon (Ugye, 1535–1598).3 In the course of his debate with Ugye, Yulgok came to deny most of the claims presented by T’oegye: he concluded (a1) that the Seven are inclusive of the Four, (b1) that the Four can be referred to as the moral mind, whereas the Seven cannot be referred to as the human mind but rather as the composite of both the moral mind and the human mind, and (c1) that in the case not only of the Four but also of the Seven,
The present article primarily examines whether Yulgok’s theory of mind is fully consistent. In doing this, I shall take three steps. Firstly, I shall examine T’oegye’s positions on the claims (a)–(c),5 secondly, evaluate Yulgok’s reasons for objecting to them, and, thirdly, show explicitly what his own views were on the relationship between psychological factors such as feelings, mind, etc. In this discussion, I shall point out that Yulgok’s theory is consistent to a large extent, but that his claim in (b1) that “the Four can be referred to as the moral mind” is inappropriate and makes the whole theory inconsistent. I shall suggest that the best way to make it fully consistent would be to claim that the Four can be referred to not as the moral mind, but rather as the composite of the moral mind and the human mind, as he did for the Seven.
1Although T’oegye and Yulgok were orthodox Neo-Confucians who faithfully followed Zhu Xi’s teachings, the former often took different routes and arrived at different conclusions from the latter. In relation to this debate, Zhu Xi was concerned neither with the relationship between the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings nor with that between the moral-human mind and the Four-Seven (see Chung, 1995, 44 and 87). Moreover, although he did once mention the Four and the Seven in terms of li and ki, he did not attempt to provide any detailed explanation or argument (Zhuzi yu-lei [Classified dialogues of Master Zhu] 53:83, “The Four, these are the bal of li, and the Seven, these are the bal of ki”). His proposition is similar to T’oegye’s first proposition, but their wordings are slightly different (see (P2) in note 8 below). 2The term ‘Four Beginnings’ is from the Book of Mencius 孟子 (2A:6) in which Mencius introduces the mind of commiseration, the mind of shame and dislike, the mind of deference and compliance, and the mind of right and wrong, as the beginning of benevolence, the beginning of righteousness, the beginning of propriety, and the beginning of wisdom, respectively. In brief, according to Mencius, the four virtues (i.e. benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom) are the evidence of the goodness of human nature, and those virtues manifested are called the Four Beginnings or Minds, which Zhu Xi understands as feelings. On the other hand, the Seven Feelings (i.e. pleasure, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hatred, and desire) are introduced in the chapter “Liyun” in the Book of Rites (Liji, 禮記), as basic human feelings. Moreover, in the first chapter of the Doctrine of the Mean (Zhongyong, 中庸), the Seven are reduced to four in number including pleasure, anger, and sorrow with joy added to the list. Whether the number of the feelings is seven or four, it is understood as referring to all the feelings that human beings have. Since this is the case, the Four Beginnings, insofar as they are feelings, must be included in them, too. Thus, there arises a serious problem when T’oegye accepts that they are feelings, but denies that they belong to the Seven Feelings. See Santangelo (1990, 234–270) for an introductory account of the Four-Seven Debate. 3This debate is often called the Human Mind-Moral Mind Debate because the subject-matter with which they were largely concerned was the moral mind and the human mind. However, it is also called, and regarded as a part of, the Four-Seven Debate since the main issues of the former were originally derived from the latter. Indeed, Sŏng Hon’s initial questions to Yulgok were abouy the acceptability of T’oegye’s conclusions and, later on about some issues which derived from them. 4Cf. TKYU, 478–479 5This is because, although Yulgok was debating with Ugye, the latter was merely representing T’oegye’s views to a large extent. For this, Chung (1995, 85) rightly points out, “... even though Yulgok was writing to Ugye, his real debate was with T’oegye; Ugye simply provided him with T’oegye’s perspectives. In general, Yulgok’s letters are longer and better organized than Ugye’s ...”
As noted, the Four-Seven Debate begins with Kobong’s criticism of T’oegye’s emendation of Chŏng Chiun’s (Chuman, 1509–1561) proposition which characterizes the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings in relation to
Kobong’s criticism continued for about eight years (1559–1566) and in response to it T’oegye emended his own proposition at least four times.8 T’oegye’s final proposition reads thus: “The Four are the
Before examining the theory in detail, it is important to note that the word “
Yulgok criticizes T’oegye’s propositions on the Four and the Seven for the reason that they appear to ascribe an active connotation to
On the other hand, Yulgok’s interpretation of T’oegye’s
If so, what is it that makes them different from each other? According to the Neo-Confucian idea,
Yulgok’s criticism is that, if that is the case, then there are two sources and, also, two types of the goodness of human nature. He thinks that the Four and the Seven are not two different sorts of feelings.16 For Yulgok, the Seven refer to all the human feelings irrespective of whether they are good or evil. The Four refer only to good feelings among them.17 Of course, this idea is closely related to his understanding of the relationship between
6It has been generally consented that T’oegye and Kobong were deeply concerned with the problem of the movability of li, but I think that this is not true. This problem was rather a subject of the debate between Yulgok and Ugye. Since Kobong did not comment much about T’oegye’s views on this matter, we have to examine Yulgok’s remarks to shed light on this issue. 7Ed. note: The McCune-Reischauer romanization for the term bal (發) is pal, but as the author of this article considers bal to be the generally accepted romanization of this term in Western Neo-Confucian studies and because it appears later in the article as bal in such compounds as hobal, mibal and ibal, he has chosen to use the romanization bal throughout this article. 8As for Chuman’s original proposition, (P1), T’oegye made at least four emendations, (P2)–(P5), in accordance with Kobong’s consistent criticisms. At the end of their debate, Kobong presented his own proposition, (P6). The propositions presented in the debate are as follows: Chuman’s Original Proposition (1537), (P1) “The Four Beginnings are the bal from li, and the Seven feelings the bal from ki”; T’oegye’s First Emendation (1553), (P2) “The Four Beginnings are the bal of li, and the Seven feelings are the bal of ki”; T’oegye’s Second Emendation (1559), (P3) “The bal of the Four Beginnings is li only and [they are] nothing but good, and the bal of the Seven feelings is [not only li but] combined with ki and [they are] good or evil”; T’oegye’s Third Emendation (1559), (P4) “In the bal of the Four Beginnings, li predominates, and in the bal of the Seven Feelings, ki predominates”; T’oegye’s Fourth Emendation (1560), (P5) “The Four are the bal of li and ki follows it, and the Seven are the bal of ki and li rides on it”; Kobong’s Final Proposition (1561), (P6) “In the bal of feelings, at times li moves and ki is together with it, or at times ki is stimulated and li rides on it.” For the detailed references and, also, the reasons for rejecting each proposition, see Yoo (2011), Ch. 2, Sec. 1 and Yoo (forthcoming), Ch. IV. 9Mingran (2006), 155–183; Santangelo (1990), 237. 10Apart from these translations, Jin (1987, 351 f.) prefers to translate it as “emanate/emanation.” There is also another question whether the same translation is applicable to all the places of bal in (P1)–(P6). For this problem with the translation of the word, see Yoo (2011), 37–39. 11In any case, it is odd that he accepts “li’s riding” for some reason and refuses “li’s arousing” as being active because both phrases may be equally read to have an active connotation. The only way to sort out this seeming inconsistency is to interpret “li’s riding” as somehow having an inactive connotation: that is, “riding” here does not mean a man on the ground climbing onto a horse, but a man who is already sitting on a horse. In the latter case, the man and the horse do not necessarily involve any priority in time, but coexist side by side. This is a possible interpretation, but, since Yulgok does not give us any hint over this matter, it is still controversial. 12TKYU, 421–422, “But, since the theory that “li arouses and ki follows it” implies the priority and posteriority [in time], how come this will not damage [the theory of] li? ... to say that “[something] is aroused from li” is the same as to say that “nature is aroused and becomes a feeling,” but if we say that “li arouses and ki follows it” means that ki does not interrupt at the beginning of the arousal, but follows li after it arouses, how can it be true?” (The words in brackets are mine.) 13See TKYU, 413, 420, 478–479 etc. Once again, this is Yulgok’s understanding of T’oegye’s use of li, but I am inclined to think that his understanding is mistaken. As seen, T’oegye claims that the Four and the Seven Feelings can be divided into two different categories and explained in terms of li and ki, whereas Kobong claims that they must not be. It seems to me that the reason for their making such contrary claims, despite the fact that they share many of Zhu Xi’s views, is that T’oegye’s division of the Four and the Seven in terms of li and ki is conceptual, whereas Kobong as well as Yulgok construe him to have an actual division in mind. Again, T’oegye’s separation of the Four from the Seven or li from ki is conceptual in the sense that it is a separation in thought, but not in reality. For a detailed discussion of this point, see Yoo (2011), 46–52. 14It is, however, to be noted that Yulgok thinks of T’oegye’s bal as ‘arousal’ or ‘movement’ rather than as ‘origin.’ 15Chung (1995, 70) rightly states that T’oegye “gave a more positive view of the Seven Emotions, suggesting that they are “originally good” rather than “both good and evil.” 16See TKYU, 526–532. 17TKYU, 420, 424–425.
3. THE CHARCTERISTICS OF THE MIND
By referring to one of his letters to T’oegye, entitled
According to Neo-Confucianism, there are three important psychological factors whose relationship is described in a proposition, “The mind commands nature and feelings.” Yulgok in his
In this way, Yulgok distinguishes various types of psychological factors according to their functions. Furthermore, he divides the mind, nature, and feelings into two types each. As he divides the mind into the moral mind and the human mind, and feelings into the Four and the Seven, he also divides nature into the original nature and the physical nature. It seems that the moral mind, the Four, and the original nature are said to be closely related to
Let us now consider Yulgok’s explanation of the Four and the Seven in terms of
As seen above, T’oegye describes the Seven as originating from
Although this line of reasoning sounds valid, it does not apply to the case of the mind. That is, although the moral mind is said to have the moral characteristic of goodness, it is not the case that it refers to the aspect of
18TKYU, 146–147, 412. 19TKYU, 412. T’oegye did not say anything about this matter in his debate with Kobong, and so this is Ugye’s original claim. 20TKYU, 146–147. 21In fact, in his first letter to Yulgok, Ugye agrees with Kobong by saying that “it is all right to say that the moral mind ‘is’ the Four, but it is not right to say that the human mind ‘is’ the Seven” (TKYU, 402). However, it must be a simple mistake. “Is” in the above quotation should be understood as an identification of some sort, that is, most presumably, an identification of their moral characteristics. 22This term “ŭi 意” generally means “will” and it is translated accordingly, as Kalton translates it in his book (1994, 115). However, as we shall shortly see, its function is rather like “deliberation” as I translate it. 23Yi (2003), 77 note 9. 24Yulgok chŏnsŏ (Complete works of Yi I) 14:33b, “Non simsŏngjŏng.” In saying this, he might mean to tell us that all the psychological factors are not completely different entities, but different features of the same entity which occur in turn at different times. 25TKYU, 407–408. 26TKYU, 487–488. 27TKYU, 406.
4. A SINGLE ORIGIN OF THE MIND
In his first letter to Yulgok, Ugye writes that, since the moral mind is derived from the correctness of Heaven and destiny, and the human mind from the personal orientation of the physical form, it is all right to explain the Four and the Seven in terms of
This close connection or the inseparability between
Yulgok thinks that the moral mind can become the human mind and, also, the human mind can become the moral mind. This suggests that the two types of the mind are not two different entities, but two different names for one and the same entity. If he conceived, as Ugye did, that the moral mind and the human mind were derived from two different sources, he would not be able to claim their mutual relationship. For to say that the moral mind is derived from
However, Yulgok’s identification of the two types of the mind with those of feelings and, also, with those of nature raises a difficult problem for his theory of mind. When he identifies the Four with the moral mind and the Seven with the composite of the moral mind and the human mind,32 it is not immediately clear what this identification is about. We can be sure that it is not meant to claim the literal identification of the mind with feelings because he explicitly distinguishes their functions as psychological factors. Rather, considering his frequent mention of such factors in terms of
I once thought that his identification of the Seven with the composite of the moral mind and the human mind was inappropriate.33 At the time, as opposed to Yulgok’s claim, I thought that, since the Seven and the human mind had the moral characteristics of goodness as well as evilness, the former should be identified with the latter, not with the composite of the latter and the moral mind. From this, I also thought that, since Yulgok denied that the human mind included the moral mind, but admitted that the moral mind was good, he would be understood as claiming that the human mind was evil. If so, the two minds which were defined as having contrary properties would not have the mutual relationship of becoming each other as beginning and end. Therefore, I reached the conclusion that Yulgok’s theory of mind was inconsistent.
However, I was wrong at the time in thinking that the human mind is only evil. If both
However, I still think that his theory is inconsistent, but for a different reason. In fact, I am now inclined to think that his identification of the moral mind with the Four cannot be accepted. For, as opposed to the Seven, which include the Four, the human mind does not include the moral mind. The thing is that, if the moral mind is always aroused in the composite of
Again, it is inappropriate for Yulgok to identify the Four with the moral mind. And it seems to me that the only way for him to sort out the implicit problem with this identification is to give up the idea that the moral mind and the Four have the same sort of moral characteristic of goodness. Otherwise, he unwillingly has to accept the view that the moral mind refers to the good part of the human mind as in the cases of the Four-Seven feelings or the original-physical nature. In fact, if one were to be consistent with the two views that the moral mind was derived from
If despite all the anticipated problems, one desperately wants to maintain the identification of the moral mind with the Four, one has to accept Ugye’s view that the relationship between the moral mind and the human mind is the same as that between the Four and the Seven, or between the original nature and the physical nature. For Ugye, the moral mind, the Four, and the original nature share the same moral characteristics, as the human mind, the Seven, and the physical nature do. Moreover, he admits that the latter psychological factors include the former ones. However, as stated above, for Yulgok since the moral mind is derived from the composite of both
28TKYU, 481–484. Cf. Chung (2011), 97–98. 29Cf. Chung (1995), 90–91. 30TKYU, 407. 31TKYU, 405; 407–408. 32TKYU, 404. 33Yoo (2011), 76–77. 34TKYU, 405–406 and 418–419. 35Moreover, the moral mind is not a name for a psychological activity that originally has a characteristic of goodness, but a name for some phenomenon that is found to have such a characteristic.
In this article, I have tried to evaluate the consistency of Yulgok’s theory of mind by examining his identification of the moral characteristics of the moral mind with those of the Four. As mentioned, this identification is not to claim that the moral mind refers to the same psychological factor as the Four, but that they share the same moral characteristic of goodness which has its origin in
Indeed, there seems to be a merit that can be obtained from giving up the identification. We have briefly stated earlier that the mind is said to cover the unaroused state of nature as well as the aroused state of feelings or deliberation. Since an unaroused state, i.e. a state before confronting external objects, is good, whereas an aroused state, i.e. a state after confronting external objects, is either good or evil, the mind must have the moral characteristics of goodness as well as evilness. It is not clear whether the mind here refers to the moral mind or the human mind. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that it has to have both of the moral characteristics. Thus, Yulgok’s characterization of the moral mind as pure goodness without any evilness conflicts with his thesis that “the mind commands nature, feelings, and deliberation.” In consequence, the suggestion to give up the identification of the moral mind with the Four also helps his theory of the mind to be consistent. Although there seems to be this much merit, we still have to wait for another occasion to see whether there are any other consequences that will result from giving up the identification. Indeed, there remain such questions, most importantly, as to whether and how far it will improve or damage his theory as a whole.